This paper reports on an empirical investigation of the relationship between long-term stock returns and the percentage of institutional stock ownership for the period from July 1982 to December 1994. It is shown that, on average, the biggest high-IO stocks outperform their low-IO size and book-tomarket matches by roughly 60 basis points per month. Because in IO-sorted groups average contemporaneous IO change is always larger for low-IO stocks than for high-IO stocks, and because the positive relation between returns and contemporaneous IO changes is stronger for relatively smaller stocks, the IO effect is substantially attenuated in portfolios that go long on relatively smaller high-IO stocks and short on their low-IO size and book-to-market matches. If IO change is controlled for, the IO effect is strong for all the sample stocks from the top four NYSE size quintiles. This suggests that a successful forecasting model for IO changes could improve trading strategies aimed at profiting from the IO effect.
INTRODUCTION
There is a growing body of literature that studies the relation of institutional activity in the stock market to stock returns. As extensively documented by empirical research, 1 both changes in stock institutional ownership (IO), and the IO level, are positively correlated with contemporaneous returns and future one-period returns. In addition, there are several pieces of evidence suggesting that IO level predicts long-term stock returns.
Whereas Nofsinger and Sias (1999) present statistical tests for benchmarkadjusted short-term returns of portfolios formed on IO change, 2 I am not aware of formal asset-pricing tests that would verify the existence of positive abnormal returns for portfolios that go long on high-IO and short on low-IO stocks. Such tests would be an essential element of comprehensive knowledge about the relation of institutional activity to long-term 3 stock returns. In this paper I provide these formal asset-pricing tests for the sample covering the period from July 1982 to December 1994. In addition, I present tests that disentangle the IO level effect from that of IO changes. I show that, on average, the biggest 4 high-IO stocks outperform their low-IO size and book-to-market matches by roughly 60 basis points (b.p.) per month. However, for smaller stocks there is no significant performance difference between high-IO stocks and their low-IO size and book-to-market matches. This is consistent with the finding by Nofsinger and Sias (1999) that returns on relatively smaller stocks are stronger related to contemporaneous IO changes. In particular, in IO-sorted stock groups, average IO change is always larger for low-IO stocks than for high-IO ones, because there is more room for high-IO stocks to go down in terms of IO, and more room for low-IO stocks to go up in terms of IO. Together with the stronger relation between returns and contemporaneous IO changes for smaller stocks, this leads to weaker IO effect for relatively smaller stocks. However, if IO change is controlled for, the IO effect is strong for all the sample stocks from the top four NYSE quintiles. I show that this cannot be explained by price pressure, momentum, stock turnover, or the S&P effect. In addition, I present evidence suggesting that the S&P500 effect is likely to be largely attributable to the IO effect, and that the only separate S&P effect beyond the IO effect might be due to increases in the index liquidity.
Performing a formal asset-pricing test is important not just per se, but also in the context of the extensive debate about whether institutions' participation in the stock market drives stock prices towards fundamental values (by means of speeding price adjustment) or away from them (e.g., through positive-feedback trading strategies not based on fundamentals). Whereas some researchers claim that extensive institutional stock buying and herding into certain (groups of) stocks creates "price pressure" and drives prices away from fundamentals (see Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) for a comprehensive discussion of this literature), others (e.g., Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and Wermers (1999) ) suggest that high returns contemporaneous to significant IO changes may be due to information, and IO changes may be correlated with this information. The evidence in favor of this suggestion includes the absence of stock return reversals for significant periods of time following notable IO increases, 5 which supports the idea that institutional herds speed up the price-adjustment process and are not destabilizing.
The discussion of institutional herding in the literature has traditionally included the question whether institutions follow price momentum strategies. I find that for big sample stocks (those from the top four NYSE size quintiles), there is no significant difference between prior one-year returns of stocks that institutions buy and stocks that institutions sell. However, this difference is significant for small sample stocks (those from the bottom NYSE size quintile). This is consistent with prior findings (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) , Nofsinger and Sias (1999) , Wermers (1999) ) that institutional 5 See section 2 ("Literature Review") for references and a more detailed discussion of the absence of return reversal after notable IO increases. feedback trading is largely restricted to smaller capitalization stocks. Yet, this finding does not imply price pressure for big stocks (i.e., that changes in IO drive returns on big stocks): as noted by Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1998) , the positive relation between IO changes and returns over the same period may also occur if institutional investors are successfully forecasting short-term returns. 6 Gompers and Metrick (2001) suggest another reason (conceptually different from herding) why institutional activity might affect stock returns. According to these authors, the compositional shift in stock ownership from individuals toward institutions has been causing "demand shocks" identified by the time-series fluctuations in institutional flows rather than the cross-sectional bunching of these flows (as in herding). Because, compared to individuals, institutions allocate a larger share of their portfolio to big stocks, the continuous shift in stock ownership from individuals toward institutions tends to continuously increase demand for the stock of large corporations and decrease the demand for the stock of small corporations. Gompers and Metrick (2001) claim that the disappearance of the size effect (the historical small-company stock premium) starting in the 1980's can be largely attributed to price movements in response to these demand shocks. 7 However, if these authors are right in claiming that IO level proxies for expected future demand shocks, and that it is mostly these demand shocks that have eliminated the size effect, then the size effect should show up for stocks that have substantially different sizes but the same level of IO. I show that the data do not support this prediction: the size effect has disappeared within the group of stocks (with a pretty wide size range) that have equally high IO. The size effect shows up only within the group of the lowest IO (and hence the smallest, on average) stocks, which is most likely attributable to differences in their liquidities. 6 One of the problems in finding the causality of the relationship between institutional buying and price changes is that comprehensive institutional holdings data are quarterly, and with these data it is impossible to find out, e.g., whether within-quarter trading strategies respond to within-quarter price moves (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1992) . 7 Another appealing feature of the demand shock story is that this story is consistent with the above-mentioned absence of stock return reversals for significant periods of time following notable IO increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides more details on the literature related to the topic of this paper. Section 3 describes the methodology and the rationale for its choice. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 presents the results.
Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses prospects for further research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Several studies have documented the relation of IO and IO changes to stock returns.
First, several studies (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) [LSV], Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) , Wermers (1999) , Nofsinger and Sias (1999) , Cohen, Gompers, and Vuolteenaho (2002) [CGV]) clearly document contemporaneous positive correlation of changes in stock institutional ownership (IO) and returns.
Next, Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) , Wermers (1999), Nofsinger and Sias (1999) , Gompers and Metrick (2001) , CGV, and others find evidence that shortterm returns are higher (lower) for stocks that have recently been subject to significant institutional buying (selling). In addition, this relationship does not vanish after controlling for momentum in stock prices (Wermers (1999) , Nofsinger and Sias (1999)).
Last, IO level has been found to predict future returns. For example, Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997 ), Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1997 ), Wermers (2000 , Gompers and Metrick (2001) , CGV, and others find that IO level is positively related to future one-period stock returns.
In addition, there are several pieces of evidence suggesting that IO level predicts long-term stock returns. In particular, examining the new issues puzzle, Field (1997) shows that IPO's with higher institutional ownership (IO) do not appear to significantly underperform a portfolio of seasoned firms matched by firm size, whereas IPO's with smaller institutional shareholdings frequently earn less than the risk-free rate in the long run. In a more recent study, CGV show that the IO level has 0.64 correlation with their measure of long-horizon expected return-the market-adjusted "atypical discount"
computed from their VAR model. (1999) show that a positive relation between returns and contemporaneous IO changes exists for both past extreme "losers" and past extreme "winners." That is, the tendency for stocks purchased by institutional investors to outperform those that they sell does not appear to be fully explained by the return from momentum strategies.
In addition to the analysis of contemporaneous correlation of IO changes and returns, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) present tests of the forecasting ability of IO changes.
In their data, the difference in size-adjusted average returns between the decile of firms with the largest increase in IO and the decile of firms with the largest decrease in IO during a given year amounts to 5.43 percent during the following year. In the second year following the change in ownership, the difference in returns is smaller, but still there is no return reversal.
The paper discussed above is a part of an extensive discourse about the impact of institutional trading on stocks prices. LSV and Nofsinger and Sias (1999) provide a comprehensive discussion of the relevant literature. A considerable part of this literature addresses the most common reason of significant IO changes-the cross-sectional herding by institutions towards or away from certain (groups of) stocks. 9 With regard to the effect of institutional herding on prices, the literature offers two opposite views. According to 8 Their IO change portfolios have been orthogonalized w.r.t. the IO level.
9 Wermers (1999) provides a thorough review of theories explaining why institutional investors might trade together. one view, extensive institutional stock buying and herding creates "price pressure" and drives prices away from fundamentals. According to the opposing view, institutions herd when they receive correlated private information or when they infer private information from the prior trades of better-informed managers. Such herding can move prices toward fundamentals, rather than away from them.
The discussion of institutional herding in the literature has traditionally included the question of whether herding arises when institutions engage in positive-feedback trading by means of following momentum strategies.
10 One view of this issue is that momentum trading can be destabilizing if it is based on trend chasing (as in De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) ) and leads institutions to buy overpriced stocks and sell underpriced stocks, thereby contributing to a further divergence of prices away from fundamentals (LSV). Another view is that positive-feedback trading is not necessarily a destabilizing strategy: such trading will bring prices closer to fundamentals if stock price adjustment to news about fundamentals tends to be delayed because an average investor underreacts to news (LSV). Such underreaction (presumably explained by "irrational" behavior of individual investors) can be the reason why institutions may follow "rational" positive-feedback strategies (those with a permanent price impact, as opposed to "irrational" positive-feedback trading strategies, which have a temporary price impact).
The slow speed of price adjustment may also be due to slow diffusion of information (rather than underreaction). This idea is supported by the finding that momentum strategies work better among stocks that are usually associated with slower diffusion of information, that is, among stocks in small-stock NYSE/AMEX size deciles and stocks with low analyst coverage (Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000) . There are several pieces of empirical evidence supporting the idea that the momentum effect can be caused by a delayed adjustment of stock prices to news about fundamentals. For example, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) show that there is little sign of return reversals for stocks with high price and earnings momentum (after the 12-month momentum effect).
The evidence of the absence of stock return reversals for significant periods of time 10 See LSV for the discussion of early theories of the impact of institutional trading on stock prices.
following notable IO increases includes the result in Wermers (1999) , who demonstrates (using quarterly data) that any observed stock price adjustments following heavy buying by mutual funds appear to be permanent. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) , using annual data, obtain a similar result not only for stocks owned by mutual funds, but for all the NYSE stocks with IO data available in Standard and Poors Security Owner's Stock Guides. In particular, these authors report the absence of return reversal for at least two years following institutional herding. Another supporting result is obtained by CGV who show, utilizing VAR methodology, how long-term return reaction to positive return shocks differs depending on the sign of IO shock contemporaneous to the return shock.
Specifically, stocks with negative IO shocks contemporaneous to positive return shocks experience a reversal of positive market-adjusted returns after a short continuation of these returns. However, for stocks with positive IO shocks contemporaneous to positive return shocks, positive market-adjusted returns do not reverse. Instead, these returns appear to increase slightly after the one-year horizon. The above-listed findings of return continuation for stocks bought by institutions are also consistent with other earlier studies that focus on the returns of assets held by professional investors rather than on the returns realized by these investors (e.g., Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) ). These findings suggest that high returns contemporaneous to significant IO changes may be due to information (as in Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) ) rather than to price pressure, and IO changes may be correlated with this information.
11
Another piece of evidence supporting the idea of institutional trading based on private information is the finding (e.g., in LSV and Nofsinger and Sias (1999) ) that institutional feedback trading is primarily restricted to smaller stocks, which are usually associated with a more pronounced information asymmetry problem. In particular, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) show that while in the smallest four NYSE capitalization deciles, the stocks bought by institutions had significantly higher prior returns than those sold by institutions, in the largest four NYSE capitalization deciles, there was no significant difference in prior performance of stocks bought and sold by institutions. In fact, in the largest NYSE capitalization decile, the stocks that institutional investors sold exhibited a slightly higher lag performance than the stocks that institutional investors Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) ), when SUE (earnings "surprises"), the measure based on the accounting return on equity (ROE), was used as a cash-flow news proxy.
13
When the VAR cash-flow news is used as a cash-flow news proxy instead of ROE, the marginal relation between past one-year stock return and future one-year stock return is driven from positive to negative. 14 Specifically, for a given level of ROE, institutions buy more of a firm with higher contemporaneous stock return. Hence, it is tempting to 12 In their sample, the four bottom size quintiles, in which stocks do underreact to cash flow news, include at most 20% of the total market capitalization. 13 CGV note that because past stock returns have incremental forecasting power with respect to future SUEs in the U.S. data, the SUE is not a perfect proxy for all new information about all future cash flows.
conclude that institutional buying pushes prices above the fundamental values. However, when the VAR cash-flow news proxy (which captures the new information about all future cash flows) is used, institutions actually sell firms that have too high (compared to cash-flow news) contemporaneous stock returns. That is, the relation reverses and becomes inconsistent with the price pressure hypothesis, because if cash-flow news is exogenous, such pattern in institutional trading cannot feed back to cause further price increase. CGV also note that, because institutions do not appear to "jump in" during "price rallies" that are not justified by cash-flow fundamentals, it is difficult to classify institutions as either the noise traders or the sophisticated investors in the destabilizingspeculation model of De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) , mentioned earlier in this section.
METHODOLOGY

Average adjusted returns technique
In order to compare returns on stocks with high-and low-IO, I utilize the average adjusted returns (AARs) technique, which is one type of benchmark method. In this technique, returns of sample firms are adjusted by subtracting the returns on the relevant benchmark. Individual firms' adjusted returns are then averaged across all firms every month in order to compute AARs. The mean of these monthly AARs is the average return on an equal-weight portfolio that goes long on the target stocks and short on the benchmark.
In most cases I report monthly means of AARs and standard errors of those means. In some cases I choose to report cumulative AARs (CAARs) as well. This facilitates an analysis of the dynamics of AARs over different time periods. In order to compute CAARs, the monthly AARs are summed over time.
I have chosen the benchmark method because the alternative, time-seriesregression-based, methods are questionable for long-term studies: they require that factor loadings in regressions be stationary, whereas they are actually non-stationary when test portfolios are not formed based on size and book-to-market ratio.
15
To perform a benchmark adjustment, I utilize the matching firm benchmark. I choose the matching firm for each individual sample firm in a manner that ensures the similarity of the two firms in book-to-market ratio and size -the two characteristics that Fama and French (1993) use to form their factor proxies in the three-factor model. I choose size and book-to-market characteristics for the adjustment procedure in order to use the three-factor model as a null hypothesis for statistical tests.
In the following three subsections, I set forth the rationale for the use of the AAR technique, and describe the detailed procedure for computing AARs and CAARs.
Why additive cumulation?
From a statistical perspective, mean AAR and CAAR are equivalent: the latter can be obtained by multiplying the mean AAR by the number of months over which the mean AAR was computed. Essentially, both mean AARs and CAARs are based on cumulating simple monthly returns over time.
The additive cumulation procedure used in this technique is not problem-free.
However, it is statistically more justifiable than its alternative -the multiplicative procedure. On the one hand, Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Conrad and Kaul (1993) have argued that additive cumulation procedures are systematically positively biased because of the bid-ask spread 16 . On the other hand, Kothari and Warner (1997) have shown that tests using buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) (based on multiplicative cumulation) are at least as misspecified as those using CAARs, the former being significantly more skewed, because multiplicative cumulation increases skewness.
Furthermore, empirical tests based on additive cumulation of returns are more powerful than those based on multiplicative cumulation (as documented by Barber and Lyon (1997) ).
15 See, e.g. Fama and French (1997) for the evidence.
Another important feature of mean AARs is that a test of the null hypothesis that the mean AAR is zero is equivalent to a test of the null hypothesis that the portfolio consisting of sample stocks has a zero average monthly abnormal 17 return during the time period for which the mean AAR is computed. The average monthly returns approach creates a better basis for an asset-pricing model test, because these returns are in the metric of the asset-pricing model imposed on the test (Fama, 1997).
Why a matching firm benchmark?
A matching firm benchmark is adequate from the statistical viewpoint, likely to be free from the measurement bias, and free from the specific drawback of the alternative, the portfolio benchmark, addressed below.
The portfolio benchmark 18 has been utilized in most tests that use the three-factor model as a null. However, if one of the characteristics (e.g., size) used to form benchmark portfolios is highly correlated with some additional characteristic (e.g., IO), the benchmark portfolios will not be neutral with respect to this additional characteristic. As a consequence, if these benchmark portfolios are used in tests that employ sorts on this additional characteristic (in this paper, sorts based on IO), these tests will lead to an incorrect inference about the significance of the sorting characteristic.
From a purely statistical viewpoint, a matching firm approach is adequate because, according to Barber and Lyon's (1997) study of statistical properties of several benchmarks, t-statistics for the matching firm approach are well specified.
In addition to the statistical problems of various benchmarks, Barber and Lyon also address the problem of the measurement bias, which is related to the use of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) rather than BHARs. However, in my opinion, this bias cannot be considered significant for the matching firm technique, because Barber and Lyon (1997) have shown that tests that use CARs in lieu of BHARs produce different inferences about abnormal performance only in roughly 4% of all sampling situations for the matching firm technique, while the usual significance level of these tests is 5%.
The procedure for computing AARs and CAARs
I chose a size and book-to-market matched firm for each sample firm once in every year 19 of the sample period. Using independent sorting of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks into size and book-to-market deciles, I found the breakpoints for 100
size/book-to-market portfolios. These breakpoints defined a grid in a two-dimensional space, in which size and book-to-market played the roles of the two dimensions. I matched firms from a test sample to control firms in the same size/book-to-market cell of the grid in the following way: I defined a firm's coordinates (in percent) within the cell and minimized the distance between the sample firm and a control firm within each cell. I preferred this technique to that in Barber and Lyon (1997) because it ensures that a control firm is really the "closest" one to a sample firm in both dimensions. In order to avoid the survivorship bias, I chose matching firms regardless of whether they delisted in the future. If a matching firm was delisted before the end of the year, I chose a second matching firm for the remaining period.
In order to determine monthly adjusted returns (ARs) for each sample firm, I
subtracted the returns of the matching firm(s) from the sample firm returns. Then I calculated AARs: 
where t is the number of months in the sample.
In the formula for CAAR, 
In these formulas AARs were assumed to be serially independent.
Stock groups
Why should big stocks be considered separately from small stocks?
First, it is well known that small stocks are not liquid: they are much harder to trade than big stocks. In addition, small stocks represent only a small fraction of the market. Therefore, returns on big stocks more accurately capture the total wealth effects experienced by investors. Accordingly, big stocks traditionally play the most significant role in asset-pricing tests. On the other hand, as discussed by Fama (1997), asset-pricing anomalies are usually more pronounced for small stocks, which makes them important for detecting bad-model problems.
Next, because most of small stocks are listed on the NASDAQ, the delisting bias for NASDAQ stocks has been claimed to produce the size effect by means of overstating average returns on small stocks (Shumway and Warther, 1999) . Consequently, it's important to analyze the size effect within the groups of big and small stocks separately. Last, the same IO percentage should be viewed differently with regard to big and small stocks. While, with rare exceptions, most of big stocks' shares are available for trading on the market, small stocks are likely to have higher percentage of closely held shares and block holdings, which often provide control rights to their owners and therefore are significantly less likely to be available for purchase by institutions.
Consequently, the percentage of IO that can be labeled as "medium" for big stocks should be regarded as "high" for small stocks.
Taking into account the arguments outlined above, big and small stocks should be considered separately. Accordingly, all the sample stocks were divided into two size groups: small and big stocks. To perform this size partition, once a year all the stocks were assigned to five size portfolios based on the NYSE size breakpoints. 20 Stocks from the smallest stock portfolio are referred to below as "small stocks". Stocks from the remaining four size portfolios are called "big stocks". Such size-based partition (four size portfolios for big stocks versus one portfolio for small stocks) is explained by the fact that the smallest stock portfolio contains more than half of the entire sample of stocks.
For illustration purposes, the results for the entire sample (without the size partition described above) are presented as well. These results suggest additional reasons why it is better to consider small stocks separately from big ones.
High, low, and medium-IO groups
To perform an IO partition, once a year big stocks (defined in section 3.2.1) were assigned to three equal groups (high-IO, medium-IO, and low-IO) based on the percentage of IO. 21 The same operation was performed for small stocks, as well as for the entire sample (without size partition). This kind of IO partition was chosen in order to compare stocks from the two extreme (high-and low-IO) stock groups, having matched them on size and book-to-market ratio, or to compare stocks from each of these two groups to their size and book-to-market matches from the medium-IO group.
IO deciles when IO change is controlled for
To control for IO changes, IO change-stratified IO deciles were formed in a manner similar to that in Nofsinger and Sias (1999) . Once a year (in July), all the stocks in a given size group 22 were assigned to deciles based on the change of IO during the subsequent year. Then stocks in each IO change decile were separately assigned to IO deciles based on IO as of the end of the quarter preceding the month of decile formation.
Decile 0 corresponded to the lowest IO stocks and decile 9 to the highest IO stocks within a given IO change decile. All the stocks in each conditional IO decile N (N = 0…9) were chosen from all the IO change deciles and put together into one (IO change-stratified) IO decile N. The resulting IO change deciles were used to form high-and low-IO groups.
These IO groups had similar average IO changes. 
DATA
The three sources of data used in this study were the CRSP, Compustat, and Spectrum databases.
The returns data for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ ordinary common stocks were extracted from the CRSP monthly stock files.
In accordance with Fama and French (1993):
1. Firms included in the sample from July of a particular year t were required to have the Compustat data for the fiscal year ending in the previous calendar year t-1.
2. The accounting data for all fiscal year ends in calendar year t-1 were matched with the returns for July of year t to June of year t+1 (necessary corrections were made for the Compustat definition of fiscal year).
3. To compute a firm's book-to-market ratio, market equity at the end of December of the year t-1 was used, and to measure the size, market equity for June of the year t was used.
4. Stocks with negative book-to-market ratios were excluded.
5. Financial firms were excluded.
There was no special treatment for missing returns: the months with missing returns for a given firm were omitted.
The Spectrum database, which reports quarterly holdings of all 13(f) institutions, was used as a source of the quarterly IO data for the sample stocks. The Spectrum file available at the time of the study contained institutional holdings from the third quarter of 1981 through the fourth quarter of 1994. The CRSP matching was performed using historical CUSIPs. If a stock was not found in the Spectrum file in a particular quarter, it was assumed that it had zero IO. The percentage of IO was computed by dividing the total number of shares held by institutions as reported by Spectrum by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the last month of each calendar quarter.
This method of obtaining the percentage of IO is not completely free of mistakes, which might be due to discrepancies between reporting dates of institutions and companies. Such discrepancies were obvious for firms with fiscal quarter ends different from calendar quarter ends, when the computed IO for them exceeded 100% in some calendar quarters. Such companies were excluded from the sample for their entire life 24 .
Also excluded from the sample were those 27 firm-quarters for companies with fiscal quarters coinciding with calendar quarters in which the computed IO exceeded 100%, as these were obvious mistakes.
Stocks from the top NYSE size decile were excluded, because it was impossible to find a satisfactory size match from the low-IO group for them. Stocks with market capitalization of less than $1 million were excluded, because the IO data for them were likely to be imprecise 25 .
The resulting sample covers the period from July 1982 to December 1994 and comprises 2,809 to 3,408 stocks per calendar month.
24 They constituted less than 1% of the sample.
25 13(f) institutions are required to disclose only those common-stock positions that are greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000. This may cause IO data for very small stocks to be imprecise. The summary statistics for the sample stocks are shown in Table 1 . Fig.1 shows the quarterly IO breakpoints for both big and small stocks, as well as for all the sample stocks together. Big stocks have a significantly higher IO than small ones for all quarters, and the average IO of all the stock groups is gradually increasing over time.
RESULTS
In this section I first show that, on average, the biggest high-IO stocks outperform their low-IO size and book-to-market matches by roughly 60 b.p. per month. However, for smaller stocks there is no significant performance difference between high-IO stocks and their low-IO size and book-to-market matches. This is consistent with a prior finding that returns on relatively smaller stocks are stronger related to contemporaneous IO changes. This relation leads to a substantial attenuation of returns on portfolios that go long on relatively smaller high-IO stocks and short on their low-IO size and book-tomarket matches, because in IO-sorted groups, average contemporaneous IO change is always larger for low-IO stocks than for high-IO stocks. However, if IO change is controlled for, the IO effect is strong for all the sample stocks from the top four NYSE
quintiles.
Next, I analyze whether the IO effect could have attenuated the size effect in my sample and demonstrate that during the sample period the size effect in its "pure" version (with IO controlled for) is concentrated in the smallest stocks and is nonexistent within the top four NYSE size quintiles. This absence of return difference between stocks with similar IO levels and substantially different sizes suggests that the IO effect cannot fully account for the reversal of the size effect during the sample period.
Last, I attempt to uncover the nature of the IO effect, and I show that the documented anomaly cannot be explained by price pressure, momentum, stock turnover, or the S&P500 effect. In addition, I present evidence suggesting that the S&P effect is likely to be largely attributable to the IO effect and that the only separate S&P effect beyond the IO effect may be due to increases in the index liquidity.
The difference in returns on high-and low-IO stocks
The results in this section demonstrate that when book-to-market ratios and sizes of compared firms are similar, big high-IO stocks have higher returns than big low-IO stocks. Controlling for prior one-year returns does not eliminate this effect.
Small stocks are too volatile and too heavily affected by IO changes to establish the IO effect for them without controlling for other characteristics (IO change and prior returns).
The entire sample
First I report the results for the entire sample (without the partition into big and small stocks) and provide additional reasons for considering small and big stocks separately.
As explained in section 3.2.2, I chose to allocate all the sample stocks to three IO groups (high-IO, medium-IO, and low-IO). Table 2 shows mean monthly AARs for equal-and value-weight portfolios of high (Panel A) and low (Panel B) IO stock groups relative to their size and book-to-market matches from the medium-IO group, as well as summary statistics for all these stock groups.
For high-IO stocks, mean AAR is about 15 basis points (bp) per month. Whereas mean AAR is tiny and insignificant for stocks with size below the NYSE median, 26 for stocks with size above the NYSE median, mean AAR is about twice as high as for the entire sample (32 bp) and marginally significant. This result is attributable mostly to the biggest stocks-those above the NYSE size level 3 27 -for which mean AAR is very substantial (60 bp per month). 26 As explained in section 3.2.1, most of the matching stocks with size below the NYSE median that are labeled as "medium-IO" stocks here would be "high-IO" stocks if they were considered separately from big stocks and together with other small stocks. (This is clear from comparing their average IO to that of the high-IO small stocks in Table 3 .) Consequently, in Table 2 there are no traces of the IO effect for high-IO stocks with size below the NYSE median.
27 NYSE size level N (N = 1…9) is the breakpoint between the N th and the (N + 1) th NYSE size deciles, where decile number 1 corresponds to the largest stocks and decile number 10 corresponds to the smallest stocks. For example, the medium-IO group contains only 114 stocks above the NYSE median to match to 454 high-IO stocks in this size group and 80 stocks below the low-IO group size median to match to 524 low-IO stocks in this size group. This difference in the number of sample and matching firms may introduce additional errors in the computation of AARs.
While the overall results for the entire sample do indicate that high-IO stocks have higher returns than their low-IO matches, the problems addressed in this section support the arguments in section 3.2.1 that the IO effect should be considered separately for big and small stocks.
Big and small stocks separately
As explained in section 3.2, I have chosen to allocate sample stocks to two size groups (big and small) and three IO groups (high-IO, medium-IO, and low-IO) within each size group. Prior to partitioning small stocks on IO, I excluded stocks with size below the low-IO group size median computed for stocks in Table 2 , because it was impossible to find adequate high-IO size matches for these stocks (see section 5.1.1 for the relevant discussion). In addition, to exclude the possible influence of the IPO effect, I
chose only those matching stocks that had the Compustat data for at least five years before the year of matching.
The results in Panel A of Table 3 demonstrate that when book-to-market ratios and sizes of compared firms are similar, high-IO stocks have higher returns than low-IO stocks. The IO effect is significant only for the biggest stocks (roughly for those with size above the NYSE median). The effect is strong only for stocks above the NYSE size level 3.
In order to verify that the IO effect for big stocks is not attributable to the momentum effect, I report the IO effect results when momentum is controlled for. For this purpose, in Panel B of Table 3 , I perform matching on prior returns (PR1Y 29 ) decile and size. Book-to-market matching is not done in Panel B, because with threedimensional matching (on size, book-to-market ratio, and PR1Y), I would fail to find matching stocks for many stocks in my sample. 30 Matching on size and PR1Y decile does not eliminate the IO effect for the largest stocks. The effect is slightly reduced, but this may be attributable to the increase in the book-to-market mismatch: without book-tomarket matching, book-to-market ratio is slightly higher for matching (low-IO) stocks.
Continuing the discussion of momentum trading by institutions, it is interesting to note (see Table 4 ) that in my sample there is practically no difference in prior one-year returns (PR1Y) between big stocks that institutions buy and big stocks that institutions 29 PR1Y for a given portfolio year (starting in July) is computed by means of simple compounding of monthly returns from July till May (11 months) of the previous portfolio year. 30 Omitting book-to-market matching is significantly less critical in my tests than omitting size matching, because the correlation of IO and book-to-market is much lower than the correlation of IO and size.
sell. However, this difference is significant for small stocks, which is consistent with the evidence in the literature documenting that momentum trading by institutions is primarily concentrated in small stocks. In additions, returns on small stocks are too heavily affected by IO changes and are too volatile to establish the IO effect for these stocks without controlling for other characteristics (in addition to book-to-market ratio and size), such as IO change and prior returns. I deal with this issue in the following subsection.
Big and small stocks separately when IO change is controlled for
Because there is more room for high-IO stocks to go down in terms of IO, and more room for low-IO stocks to go up in terms of IO, IO change is always larger for low-IO stocks than for high-IO ones (see Table 3 ). Because (as documented in the literature) returns are highly correlated with contemporaneous IO change, this systematic IO change difference counteracts the IO effect. In addition, this difference guarantees that price pressure cannot explain positive excess returns on a portfolio that goes long on high-IO stocks and short on their low-IO size and book-to-market matches.
In Table 5 , I attempt to control for contemporaneous IO changes by means of using IO change-stratified IO groups. In order to form these groups, I first exclude all the sample stocks with size below the low-IO group size median from Table 2 (for the reason discussed in section 5.1.1). Then I form IO change-stratified IO deciles in the manner described in section 3.2.3 and use these deciles to form IO change-stratified IO groups.
For big stocks, the high-IO group is composed of (IO change-stratified) IO deciles 7, 8, and 9, and the low-IO group is composed of (IO change-stratified) IO deciles 0, 1, and 2.
For small stocks, the high-IO group is composed of (IO change-stratified) IO deciles 8 and 9, and the low-IO group is composed of (IO change-stratified) IO deciles 0 and 1. 31 As can be seen in Table 5 (compare columns labeled "IO change" for sample and matched stocks), this attempt to control for IO changes is pretty successful for big stocks and less successful for small ones. 31 I have chosen to include fewer IO deciles for small stocks, because for these stocks the overlap in IO between deciles was more considerable than for big stocks. Consequently, in order to avoid an overlap in IO between high-and low-IO groups of small stocks, I had to include fewer deciles in these groups.
When IO change is controlled for, the IO effect is strong for big stocks without any size restrictions. The effect does not go away if, in order to control for momentum (in a manner similar to that in section 5.1.2), I replace matching on size and book-to-market by matching on size and PR1Y decile. Also, the IO effect does not vanish if I exclude S&P stocks from my sample. The latter result suggests that the IO effect cannot be explained by the S&P effect. I provide a more extensive discussion of this issue in section 5.4.
For small stocks, conditional IO effect works only for relatively bigger stocks and when PR1Y is controlled for. Note, however, that as reported in Table 5 , controlling for IO changes was not very successful for small stocks, and the resulting differences in IO change between sample and matching stocks may have mitigated the "pure" IO effect.
The size effect when IO is controlled for
Because size and IO are highly correlated, it is important to find out whether the IO effect might have altered the size effect. As outlined in Section 1, Gompers and Metrick (2001) have hypothesized that the IO effect caused the reversal of the size effect during the latest time period. In this section, I control for the IO effect and show that the "pure" size effect is significant for the low-IO stocks (the majority of which are from the bottom NYSE size quintile), but this "pure" size effect is practically nonexistent within the group of high-IO stocks. The latter finding suggests that the disappearance of the size effect cannot be fully attributed to the influence of the IO effect.
To detect the size effect, it is necessary to ensure an adequate size difference between compared stocks. In order to achieve sufficient size dispersion while controlling for the IO effect, I analyze the size effect within different IO groups. I have chosen this strategy instead of considering the size effect for the sample as a whole because the partition of the entire sample into smaller and bigger stocks would result in significant difference in average IO between these two stock groups. In this case, it would be difficult to single out the pure size effect because it would be impossible to match on IO a sufficiently large number of stocks from different size groups.
To form the size groups, once a year (in July) I assign stocks in each IO group to two equal groups based on size: smaller stocks and bigger stocks. In order to single out the "pure" size effect, I match each smaller (sample) stock to a bigger (matched) stock based on IO and book-to-market ratio. Table 6 shows the results of this matching: controlling for IO is remarkably successful. I compute monthly AARs for each smaller stock relative to its bigger match. The means of these AARs are reported in Table 6 .
Panel A of Table 6 reports results for high-IO stocks 32 . In this panel, average sizes of sample and matching stocks are close to average sizes of small and big stock populations. Consequently, the size difference between the two groups would be substantial enough to detect the "pure" size effect if this effect existed. Whereas the size effect would imply positive mean AARs, those in Panel A are negative 33 and insignificant. Increasing the size difference between sample and matching stocks does not help to reveal the size effect. I.e., there is no "pure" size effect within the group of high-IO stocks. This suggests that the disappearance of the size effect within this group is not attributable to the IO effect.
In contrast, the size effect is very strong for low-IO stocks (Panel C). Keeping in mind that these stocks are also rather small on average, I conclude that the size effect in the sample period is concentrated in the smallest stocks, which is consistent with the liquidity and information explanations of the size effect. Table 2 . 33 The negative sign may be attributable to lower contemporaneous IO change for sample (smaller) stocks. 34 Panel B reports the size effect results for both low-and medium-IO stocks with size above the size median for the low-IO group. I have chosen to present the results for this combination of the two IO groups (rather than just for the medium-IO group) in order to obtain a reasonably sized sample, because the medium-IO group did not contain enough stocks in the size range considered here. This sample size increase was possible because a satisfactory IO match between bigger and smaller stocks was easily attainable within the chosen size range; it would not have been possible if low-and medium-IO groups were pooled together without imposing restrictions on size. The resulting stock group can still be labeled as the "medium-IO" group, because it is average IO (as reported in Panel B of Table 6 ) is much closer to that of the medium-IO stocks from Table 2 than to that of the low-IO stocks. NYSE size quintile, and there is no size effect for stocks from the top four NYSE size quintiles.
It is quite possible that there is some threshold below which the lack of liquidity and information (and maybe something else in addition), as proxied for by size, has to be substantially compensated in the form of higher expected returns. For sizes above this threshold, liquidity and information become significantly less of a problem and do not require compensation. At the same time, the IO effect starts showing up for stocks with sizes above the threshold (the IO effect cannot be detected for the smallest stocks, because their IO range is very close to zero). Perhaps this pattern is one of the reasons why the size factor has not been completely driven out of empirical models that include alternative liquidity factors in addition to the three factors from Fama and French (1993) .
I conclude that the IO effect cannot fully account for the reversal of the size effect during the sample period. Still, the IO effect might have caused the reversal of the sign of the return difference between the big stock group as a whole (which has high average IO) and the small stock group as a whole (which has low average IO). However, the last claim cannot be substantiated by separating the two effects when comparing returns on big and small stocks, because, for most small stocks, it is impossible to find adequate IO matches among big stocks. In addition, in my sample, small stock returns were adversely affected by the small stock recession (Fama and French, 1995) . Consequently, this sample is probably not the best one for comparing the long-term average returns on big and small stocks.
IO and turnover
A stock with lower turnover can have a return premium relative to a stock with higher turnover, because lower turnover may indicate that the stock is less liquid.
Can the turnover premium be responsible for the IO effect? Fig.2A indicates that this is not the case. There is not much of a difference in turnover between high, medium, and low-IO 35 big stocks 36 . If any, this difference contradicts the turnover premium 35 High, medium, and low-IO groups in this section are those from section 5.1.2 and Table 3 . 36 The pattern for small stocks is very similar and is not reported.
explanation of the IO effect, because turnover is slightly higher for high-IO stocks.
Higher turnover implies that the return premium attributed to turnover should be negative for high-IO stocks, whereas the actual return premium for these stocks is positive.
S&P500 membership and the IO effect
In section 5.1.3 I have shown that excluding S&P500 stocks from the sample does not eliminate the IO effect. In this section I offer extra arguments supporting the claim that the S&P500 effect does not explain the IO effect. In addition, I present evidence suggesting that the S&P effect is likely to be largely attributable to the IO effect and that the only separate S&P effect beyond the IO effect may be due to increases in the index liquidity.
According to Teh and DeBondt (1996) , inclusion of a stock in the S&P500 index raises its expected return. The S&P500 stocks are mostly big stocks, and they are known to have high-IO. Can the S&P stocks be responsible for the IO effect for big stocks? In order to answer this question, it is important to find out whether there is a separate S&P effect in addition to the IO effect. To accomplish this, I tried to disentangle the IO and the S&P effects. For this purpose, I computed AARs for the S&P500 stocks relative to matching stocks, chosen from non-S&P stocks 37 . These AARs are shown in Table 7 Table 7 show that, on average, the IO match achieved was accurate. The mean AAR for this sample is not significant either statistically or economically.
For the purpose of comparison, I also present AARs for the same stocks, but without IO restrictions for matching stocks. The numbers in Table 7 demonstrate that AARs are significantly smaller when the IO effect is removed. In addition, I show AARs for S&P500 stocks matched to low-IO non-S&P stocks. Because the difference in IO between sample and matching stocks is higher for this sample, AARs are significantly higher than those for the sample with IO matching and for the sample without IO 37 Stocks that did not belong to the S&P500 index, as well as to the supplementary S&P500 index.
restrictions. This suggests that the S&P effect is likely to be largely attributable to the IO effect, and hence the S&P effect does not explain the IO effect. Fig. 3 shows CAARs for the sample with IO (and size and book-to-market)
matching. An important feature of these CAARs is that they are not increasing monotonically. This pattern can be consistent with increasing liquidity of the S&P500 index. To substantiate this claim, it is helpful to compare this pattern to the turnover pattern of S&P500 stocks. Fig.2B shows average turnover for these stocks. Periods of increasing turnover in Fig.2B coincide with periods of positive AARs in Fig.3 . This might mean that positive shocks to the overall S&P500 liquidity could translate into positive shocks to returns. During the period of 1988-1991, there is a negative trend in S&P500 turnover. This period is characterized by negative AARs, which is consistent with a negative liquidity premium for the S&P500 stocks relative to their non-S&P matching stocks. Consequently, it is possible that in this sample the only separate S&P effect beyond the IO effect was due to increases in the index liquidity.
Also note that turnover difference between high-and low-IO stocks in Fig.2B and does not help to re-create the size effect for big stocks: the "pure" size effect (with IO controlled for) is practically nonexistent within the group of these stocks. In this sense, the IO effect cannot fully account for the disappearance of the size effect during the sample period. The existence of a size threshold, below which the traditional size effect is important, and above which bigger stocks tend to have higher returns due to the IO effect, suggests that a popular size factor in Fama and French (1993) may be correlated not only with one or several sources of risk (liquidity, information, etc.) that induce a positive return premium for the smallest stocks, but also with a variable that explains higher returns on high-IO stocks (whether it is a variable that proxies for a priced risk or a variable that proxies for information accessible by institutions but not by individual investors). This could be a reason why the size factor has not been completely driven out of empirical models that include alternative liquidity factors in addition to the three factors from Fama and French (1993) . This supports the view that the implications of purely empirical factor models should be considered with caution if the sources of the underlying risks are not identified.
The nature of the IO effect is not understood yet, and in this paper I have demonstrated that the IO anomaly cannot be explained by price pressure, momentum, stock turnover, or the S&P500 effect. There is a need for further investigation that could shed more light on the nature of the IO effect. Whereas some studies claim that the IO effect is not associated with risk and will be gone when the average IO level in the stock market stabilizes (see, e.g., Gompers and Metrick (2001)), other studies (e.g., CGV) make attempts to, first, suggest possible explanations of why investors might choose to hold their riskier stocks in institutions and their less risky stocks in their personal accounts, and second, offer a plausible risk story for the positive correlation between expected return news and news about fundamentals. The "new project" risk story suggested in CGV is, however, more relevant for small stocks, whereas institutions primarily hold big stocks. Unlike small stocks, big stocks do not underreact to cash-flow 29 news, but the IO effect is especially pronounced for them (and is not mitigated by the effect of IO changes). Because, according to CGV, shocks to big stocks' expected returns are not correlated with cash-flow news, devising a risk story that could explain the IO premium on these stocks is especially challenging. In addition, it is important to devise tests that would allow discrimination between a long-lasting underreaction to news and increases in risk that institutions might be willing to take. This is an especially tough task because both phenomena (underreaction and increases in risk) have the same implication for future returns: a continuing (though not necessarily constant) positive return premium.
On the contrary, the third, "demand shift", story from Gompers and Metrick (2001) has directly opposite implications for future returns. This story implies that the abnormal returns of high-IO stocks will disappear once the average IO in the stock market stabilizes. Consequently, researchers can hope that future return history will eventually discriminate between the demand shift story versus the two stories discussed earlier, though this may not necessarily happen during the finite expected life of my generation. Table 1 Summary statistics
The sample is comprised of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks with Compustat data for the period July 1982-December 1994. Stocks from the top NYSE size decile and stocks with market capitalization less than $1 million are excluded. Quarterly institutional ownership (IO) data for the period 2 nd quarter 1982-4 th quarter 1994 are obtained from the Spectrum database. If a stock is not found in the Spectrum file in a particular quarter, it is assumed that it had zero IO in that quarter.
The table reports summary statistics for the sample stocks. Size is market capitalization in thousands of dollars. Book-to-market ratio (BM) is computed as in Fama and French (1993) . Institutional ownership (IO) is a fraction of stock owned by institutions (and therefore ranges from 0 to 1). Returns data for the sample of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks with Compustat data are extracted from CRSP monthly files for the period July 1982-December 1994. Stocks from the top NYSE size decile and stocks with market capitalization less than $1 million are excluded. Quarterly institutional ownership (IO) data for the period 2 nd quarter 1982-4 th quarter 1994 are obtained from the Spectrum database. Once a year (at the end of the second quarter) all the stocks are assigned to three equal groups (high-IO, medium-IO, and low-IO) based on the IO percentages.
The table reports mean monthly average excess returns (mean) and time-series standard errors of means (se(mean)) for sample stocks from high-and low-IO groups and their size-and book-to-market-matched 1 stocks from the medium-IO group for the period July 1982 -December 1994. EW returns and VW returns are monthly equal-weight and value-weight excess returns computed relative to the one-month T-bill rate. Also reported are mean monthly average adjusted returns (AAR) (the average difference between the returns on sample stocks and their matching stocks), and their time-series standard errors, mean yearly average size (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), and institutional ownership (IO) as of the end of the quarter preceding a given portfolio year. Size is market capitalization in thousands of dollars. Book-tomarket ratio is determined as in Fama and French (1993) . IO is a fraction of stock owned by institutions (and therefore ranges from 0 to 1). Returns are in percent. NYSE size level N (N = 1…9) is the breakpoint between the N th and the (N + 1) th NYSE size deciles, where decile number 1 corresponds to the largest stocks, and decile number 10 corresponds to the smallest stocks. Table 3 IO effect for big and small stocks separately
Panel A. High-IO stock group
All the sample stocks were divided into two size groups: small and big stocks. To perform this size partition, once a year (in July), all the stocks were assigned to five size portfolios based on the NYSE size breakpoints. Stocks from the smallest stock portfolio are referred to below as "small stocks". Stocks from the remaining four size portfolios are called "big stocks". Stocks from the top NYSE decile and stocks with size below the low-IO group size median from Table 2 were excluded. Once a year (at the end of the second quarter), all the stocks in each size group were assigned to three equal institutional ownership (IO) groups (high-IO, medium-IO, and low-IO) based on the IO percentages. Stocks from the high-IO group ("sample stocks") were matched to stocks from the low-IO group ("matched stocks") based on size and book-to-market ratio (Panel A) and on size and PR1Y decile (Panel B). Matched stocks were required to have the Compustat data for at least 5 years before the year of matching. EW returns and VW returns are monthly equal-weight and value-weight excess returns computed relative to the one-month T-bill rate. Also reported are mean monthly average adjusted returns (AAR) (the average difference between the returns on sample stocks and their matching stocks), and their time-series standard errors, mean yearly average size (Size), book-tomarket ratio (BM), institutional ownership (IO) as of the end of the quarter preceding a current portfolio year, and IO change during the current portfolio year, as well as prior returns (PR1Y) from July till May (11 months 2 ) of the previous portfolio year compounded monthly. Size is market capitalization in thousands of dollars. Book-to-market ratio is determined as in Fama and French (1993) . IO is a fraction of stock owned by institutions (and therefore ranges from 0 to 1). Returns are in percent.
See other notations and additional sample information in Table 2 . Table 4 Prior one-year returns
Panel A. Size and book-to-market matching
The table reports prior one-year returns and other characteristics for big and small sample stocks allocated to groups based on the magnitude of their prior returns, as well as on the direction of the subsequent change in institutional ownership (IO). Prior one-year return (PR1Y) for each sample stock was computed once a year (in July) using simple compounding of monthly returns from July till May (11 months) of the previous portfolio year. Stocks from the top NYSE decile and stocks with size below the low-IO group size median from Table 2 were excluded. Then all the stocks in each size group (defined in Table 3 ) were assigned to PR1Y deciles (decile 0 corresponded to the lowest PR1Y stocks and decile 9 to the highest PR1Y stocks). The table reports time-series means of cross-sectional averages of PR1Y, as well as the standard errors of these means. Also reported are mean yearly average PR1Y decile rankings, size (Size), institutional ownership (IO) as of the end of the quarter preceding the current portfolio year, and IO change during the current portfolio year. Size is market capitalization in thousands of dollars. IO is a fraction of stock owned by institutions (and therefore ranges from 0 to 1). Returns are in percent.
See other notations and additional sample information in Tables 2 and 3 Table 5 IO effect when contemporaneous IO change is controlled for All the sample stocks with size below the low-IO group size median from Table 2 (as well as stocks from the top NYSE decile) were excluded. Once a year (in July) all the stocks in each size group (big and small stock groups, defined in Table 3 ) were assigned to deciles based on the change of institutional ownership (IO) during the subsequent year. Then stocks in each IO change decile separately were assigned to IO deciles based on IO as of the end of the quarter preceding the month of decile formation. Decile 0 corresponded to the lowest IO stocks and decile 9 to the highest IO stocks within a given IO change decile. All the stocks in each conditional IO decile N (N = 0…9) were chosen from all the IO change deciles and put together into one (IO change-stratified) IO decile N. For big stocks, the high-IO group is composed of (IO change-stratified) IO deciles 7, 8, and 9 and the low-IO group of (IO change-stratified) IO deciles 0, 1, and 2. For small stocks, the high-IO group is comprised of (IO change-stratified) IO deciles 8 and 9 and the low-IO group of (IO change-stratified) IO deciles 0 and 1.
Stocks from the high-IO group ("sample stocks") were matched to stocks from the low-IO group ("matched stocks") based on size and book-to-market ratio, and on size and PR1Y decile. Matched stocks were required to have Compustat data for at least 5 years before the year of matching. EW returns and VW returns are monthly equal-weight and value-weight excess returns computed relative to the one-month T-bill rate. Also reported are mean monthly average adjusted returns (AAR) (the average difference between the returns on sample stocks and their matching stocks), and their time-series standard errors, mean yearly average size (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), institutional ownership (IO) as of the end of the quarter preceding a current portfolio year, and IO change during the current portfolio year, as well as prior returns (PR1Y) from July till May (11 months 3 ) of the previous portfolio year compounded monthly. Size is market capitalization in thousands of dollars. Book-to-market ratio is determined as in Fama and French (1993) . IO is a fraction of stock owned by institutions (and therefore ranges from 0 to 1). Returns are in percent.
See other notations and additional sample information in Tables 2 and 3 . Table 6 Size effect for stocks from different IO groups
The table reports returns and characteristics for smaller and bigger stocks from different IO groups defined in Table 2 . Once a year (in July), stocks in each IO group were assigned to two equal groups 4 based on size: smaller stocks and bigger stocks. Each smaller (sample) stock was matched to a bigger (matched) stock based on book-to-market ratio and IO. EW returns and VW returns are monthly equal-weight and value-weight excess returns computed relative to the one-month T-bill rate. Also reported are mean monthly average adjusted returns (AARs) (the difference between the returns on sample stocks and their matching stocks), and their time-series standard errors, mean yearly average size (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), institutional ownership (IO) as of the end of the quarter preceding the current portfolio year, and IO change during the current portfolio year, as well as prior returns (PR1Y) from July till May (11 months) of the previous portfolio year compounded monthly. Size is market capitalization in thousands of dollars. Book-to-market ratio is determined as in Fama and French (1993) . IO is a fraction of stock owned by institutions (and therefore ranges from 0 to 1). Returns are in percent.
See other notations and additional sample information in Table 2 .
Panel A. High-IO stock group from Table 7 S&P500 stocks matched to non-S&P stocks
As in all the previous tables, stocks from the top NYSE size decile were excluded from the sample. Once a year (in July), S&P500 stocks were matched (based on size and book-to-market) to stocks that did not belong to the S&P500 index, as well as to the supplementary S&P500 index. The table reports mean monthly average returns and characteristics of S&P500 stocks and their matches. EW returns and VW returns are monthly equal-weight and value-weight excess returns computed relative to the one-month T-bill rate. Also reported are mean monthly average adjusted returns (AARs) (the difference between the returns on sample stocks and their matching stocks), and their time-series standard errors, mean yearly average size (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), and institutional ownership (IO) as of the end of the quarter preceding the current portfolio year. Size is market capitalization in thousands of dollars. Book-to-market ratio is determined as in Fama and French (1993) . IO is a fraction of stock owned by institutions (and therefore ranges from 0 to 1). Returns are in percent.
See other notations and additional sample information in Share volumes as well as the numbers of shares outstanding were extracted from monthly CRSP files. Turnover was computed as the ratio of share volume to the number of shares outstanding. See Table 2 for IO group definitions. 
